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Abstract
CHINA RAILWAY Express (CR express) refers to the inter-
national container train running in the East Asian Economic 
Circle and the developed European Economic Circle, and it is 
an important link in the development of “The Belt and Road”. 
However, as CR Express is still in the early stages of develop-
ment, it is still on the way to fully market-oriented operations, 
and also has some problems such as high overall transporta-
tion cost, disorderly competition and other issues. From the 
perspective of government subsidies, this paper by searching 
the relationship in incomplete information dynamic game 
between local government and local relevant enterprises, gets 
the optimal subsidy amount for the government to obtain the 
maximum social benefit. The results can provide a reference 
for the government to formulate a reasonable subsidy policy 
and for the CR express to realize market-oriented. 
Keywords
CHINA RAILWAY Express, government subsidies, dynamic 
game, social benefit
1 Introduction
CHINA RAILWAY Express which is organized by China 
Railway Corporation, refer to the international container train 
running between China, Europe and other countries which 
involve in “The Belt and Road”; these trains runs in fixed trip, 
line, schedule and total run time, serving as an initiative carrier 
that deepens the economic and trade cooperation between China 
and the involved countries, and thus is also an important link in 
the “the Belt and Road”. By the end of June 2016, CR express 
has accumulated totally 1881 runs, while 502 of those are return 
trains; there are 16 cities of originating departure in China and 12 
overseas stops, 39 operation lines, and approximately $17 billion 
of total volume of import and export trade. The Service Platform 
of CHINA RAILWAY Express has been in operation, the scope 
of services is expanding, and the service capability is also being 
steadily enhanced. The 3 transport corridors in west, central and 
east have been paved. The west corridor now has included 20 
lines of train within China; these lines entering and leaving the 
border through Alataw Pass and Horgas Pass mainly transport 
the imports and exports goods between the Mid-western Region 
of China and Europe; the central corridor now has launched 3 
lines of train within China; these lines entering and leaving the 
border through Erenhot port mainly transport the imports and 
exports goods between the northern area of East China, the cen-
tral section of East China and Europe; the east corridor now has 
paved 14 lines of train within China, these lines entering and 
leaving the border through Manchuria port mainly transport the 
imports and exports goods between the East China, Southern 
China coast, Northeast China and Europe.
At present, the running time for the whole course of CR 
Express is about 16 days, and the transit time is about 20 days 
less than shipping, but the cost of transportation is about 10 
thousand US dollars for per FEU, which is two times of ship-
ping (see Table 1). So, if only the transport costs is consid-
ered, CR Express is not as good as the traditional shipping, 
but the transport cost and transport time should be considered 
at the same time in choosing the transport route. So when the 
transit time costs of high value added goods is taken into con-
sideration (Theofanis and Boile, 2009; Jayaram et al., 1999). 
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CR Express has its own competitive edge. The typical CR 
Express lines include “Chongqing - Xinjiang – Europe line”, 
“Wuhan - Xinjiang – Europe line”, “Zhengzhou – Europe line”, 
“Yiwu - Xinjiang – Europe line”, “Yingkou - Manchuria - 
Europe line”, etc., they have distinct characteristics in terms of 
freight hinterland, transportation organization, operation mode, 
government subsidies and so on. For example, the “Chongqing 
- Xinjiang - Europe” Express is the most mature line, and it is 
the most convenient in leaving the country; the “Zhengzhou 
- Europe” Express has the widest range of radiation and the 
highest amount of subsidies; the “Yiwu - Xinjiang - Europe” 
Express has the longest mileage, etc. 
Although CR express is an important carrier to deepen the 
economic and trade cooperation between China and the coun-
tries along and an important link in the development of “The 
Belt and Road”, in the current operation, it is still entangled with 
the problems such as: lacking freight demand, especially lack-
ing return freight demand; the procedure of leaving the country 
needs to be simplified, overall transport costs is high; transpor-
tation infrastructure and supporting services are inadequate, etc.
2 Related research
For the present, although the freight volume of CR express 
accounts for only 3%-5% of China- EU trade, the rate is grow-
ing significantly. In 2016, CR express runs for 1702 trains, and 
year-on-year growth is 109%, of which 572 of them are the 
return trains, year-on-year growth of which is up to 116% (Data 
sources: China Railway Corporation). On the problem of the 
empty container allocation, which is caused by the imbalance 
of international trade, the scholars have done a lot of research. 
Hanh (2003) has done a detailed research on the container 
logistics practice of Los Angeles and southern California in the 
United States in his report, Theofanis (2009) has got a more 
comprehensive description of the container logistics practice 
from the spatial levels of global, interregional, regional, local. 
Shintani (2007) uses heuristic algorithm to prove that the reve-
nue of service network can be increased by considering empty 
container scheduling and rental when design the transport 
network. Imai (2009) compares two typical types of liner net-
work hub and spoke (H&S) and multiport calling (MPC), and 
analyze advantages and disadvantages of these two kinds of 
network, from the perspective of the container (including the 
empty container scheduling cost point). Meng (2011) does 
more research based on Imai’s research, and he thinks that 
H&S is better than MPC on the perspective of costs.
The main difficulty to promote the facilitation of leaving the 
country is that CR express stretches across the China-Europe 
continent, passes by many countries and regions, and the level 
of economic and the infrastructure facilities of these countries 
are different. The facilitation of leaving the country involves 
many countries and a variety of gauges, and it is difficult to 
be solved in a short time, so this paper will not study this area.
High cost is an important issue in the operation of CR 
Express. For the international trade between Mid-West China 
and European countries, the short transport time of CR Express 
is an obvious advantage, so it is a good choice to use CR 
Express. However, due to various reasons, the costs of running 
CR Express are still relatively high; thus the current line of 
freight trains need to be subsidized by the local government to 
ensure normal operation (Nash, 2010; Abramovics et al., 2016). 
For example: for the Hefei - Xinjiang - Europe” line, the gov-
ernment subsidies each TEU on the foreign trade enterprises 
2000 Yuan, and each TEU for the freight forwarding business 
6000 Yuan; Chengdu subsidies the transport costs in the form 
of special funds; Chongqing subsidies to the local notebook 
producers in the direct reference of the shipping price; the 
subsidies of Wuhan also is almost the same as shipping price; 
Zhengzhou subsidies to the Express companies in the reference 
of the shipping price, at the same time the supply of goods 
within 1500 km can be freely transported to Zhengzhou.
Scholars have much researches on government subsidies. 
Sheu (2011) uses asymmetric Nash game model with uncertainty 
to study on the business negotiations and cooperation between 
the recycler and producer in green supply chain under the govern-
ment intervention; the result shows that government intervention 
measures significantly affect the bargaining among the members 
Table 1 The comparison of the cost between CR Express and traditional shipping
Type of transport Route of transport
Cost of 
transport
Time for 
transport
Total cost
High time sensitivity Low time sensitivity
Marine 
transport
River-sea Coordinated 
Transport
Chongqing - Shanghai - 
Hamburg
4000 40-45 days 23200 8800
Rail-sea transport Chongqing - Shenzhen - 
Hamburg
5000 28-36 days 18400 8360
Railway 
transport
Chongqing - Xinjiang 
- Europe
Chongqing - Alataw Pass 
-Duisburg
9700 15-17 days 16900 11500
Chongqing - 
Manchuria - Europe
Chongqing - Manchuria 
-Duisburg
8300 13-15 days 14540 9860
Unit: U.S. dollar
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in the supply chain. Hong (2011) discusses the problem of recy-
cling cost and government subsidy in the reverse supply chain of 
electronic products; he constructs the game model between gov-
ernment and manufacturers, and determines the optimal amount 
of government subsidy under the goal of maximizing social wel-
fare. Cowie (2002) chooses the chartered British Railways as an 
example, pointing that the economic subsidy should be able to 
guarantee the railway service level to reach the expectation of 
the society in the open market environment; at the same time, 
the government should reduce the amount of subsidies year after 
year, to promote railway companies to generate income. Russell 
(2007) holds that the key to the high efficiency of subsidies is 
how to make the unit price. The economics of marginal cost pric-
ing rules require the price to be set at the level of marginal cost. 
But the fixed cost of railway transportation is very high, which 
means that the marginal cost is lower than the average cost, if 
use marginal cost pricing rules, the fixed cost will be irrepara-
ble. In Western European countries, governments subsidy for 
the maintenance and investment infrastructure aiming to achieve 
marginal cost pricing. However, while government subsidies 
will bring incentives to railway operations, the government, 
especially in developing countries, will have enormous financial 
pressure. If use the average cost level pricing, the huge financial 
pressure on the government can be avoided, but the loss of social 
welfare cannot be avoided. The way to solve these problems is 
to implement price discrimination, which can recover the fixed 
cost, and reduce the welfare loss as far as possible from the mar-
ginal cost pricing (Pittman, 2007). However Nash (2010) consid-
ers that the government is obliged to provide stable financing for 
railway infrastructure managers, by direct payment of the cost of 
the marginal benefit, or by agreeing to a price above the marginal 
cost, or subsidies from the both.
From now on, only few Chinese scholars have studied on the 
problems of government subsidies in CR Express; mostly, these 
scholars research from a macro perspective, instead of the reason-
able subsidies in a quantitative way. This paper will use the way 
of dynamic games of incomplete information (Gibbons, 1992) to 
analyze the game behavior between the government and the local 
companies of CR Express, to study the government subsidy pol-
icy which is beneficial to the operation of the CR Express, and to 
provide some theoretical suggestions for the government.
3 Basic assumptions of the model
The government hands the CR Express project over to the 
enterprise, and the two parties have a principal-agent relation-
ship. Due to the fact that CR Express is in the very early stages, 
it has not yet been in fully market-oriented operation, with the 
government subsidizing part of the container freight.
In the game system composed of the government and CR 
Express (hereafter this text will be abbreviated as “enterprise”), 
both parties pursue the maximization of their own interests. The 
government expects to use few subsidies to achieve greater social 
utility; companies expect to achieve maximum benefits with less 
effort and lower costs while gaining government subsidies.
Assuming that compared to the government, enterprises 
have more comprehensive and accurate market operation 
information, which means information is asymmetry between 
government and enterprises. Therefore, this paper studies the 
dynamic game of incomplete information between government 
and enterprises. The game model is formed of three stages:
Stage 1: Government subsidy scheme.
Stage 2: Enterprises choose whether to accept the commission  
    (run the CR Express).
Stage 3: The enterprises determine efforts in operation.
In order to solve the problem, the model makes the follow-
ing assumptions:
1. When the enterprises adopt different operating effort (the 
degree of effort represented by x, x ≥ 0), there is a big dif-
ference in the level of service. The higher the level of effort 
is, the higher the level of service will be. Suppose that the 
degree of enterprise effort is linear with the service level:
F x= +a γ
a > 0, means the degree of effort is positively correlated 
with the level of service; γ means the mean value is 0, 
variance is the normal random variable of σ2 , γ, means 
the influence of external environment on service level.
2. The degree of effort of the enterprise is related to its 
operating cost, assuming that the operation cost and 
effort level is a quadratic relationship:
C b= +x C2
0
Among them, C is the operating costs for the enterprise, 
b is the cost coefficient, b > 0, C0 is the fixed cost for the 
enterprise.
3. Government subsidies to enterprises are related to the 
service level of enterprises, assuming that:
B F= + −( )α β F
Among them,  B  is the government subsidies, α is subsidies 
for the base,  β  is the subsidy coefficient,  α,  β > 0,  F̅  is the 
minimum level of service for the government.
4 The construction and solution of the model
According to the three stages of the game between the gov-
ernment and the enterprise, the model is set up in stages as 
following.
4.1 Government subsidy scheme
The benefits of government can be understood as social ben-
efits, and social benefits can be quantified by using the theory 
of consumer surplus and producer surplus. In this game model, 
the government’s revenue function can be expressed as:
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U P C IS S1 = + −
Among them,  U1  means the government revenue,  PS  means 
producer surplus,  CS  means consumer surplus,  I  means the 
cost of external effects.
Producer surplus, means the operation of the central bank 
operating income in this study, so it can be expressed as:
P Qp B CS = + −
Among them,  Q  is the freight volume of CR Express, and 
p  is the freight rate of CR Express.
Consumers’ surplus, in this study refers to the D-value 
between the maximum price of the shipper’s willingness to pay 
and the actual rate of payment, so  CS  can be expressed as:
C QS = −( )m p
Among them, m is the highest price that the shipper is will-
ing to pay.
In summary, function of government revenue can be 
expressed as:
U Qp B C Q I
1
= + − + −( ) −m p
That is,
U Qm B C I1 = + − −
The problem that the government faces is to make a rea-
sonable decision to the subsidize, so that the enterprise will 
accept the operation commission of the government, to achieve 
the maximum utility of the government, at the same time to 
encourage enterprises to actively operate.
4.2 Agency by agreement
The income of the enterprise mainly includes the freight 
paid by the shipper and the subsidy from the government. The 
cost of company is mainly operating costs. The container trans-
portation volume Q is directly related to the price of container 
and the degree of effort of the enterprise. Assuming that the 
expression of Q is:
Q = + −q q x q p
0 1 2
2
In the formula is the fixed volume of the container, q0 is the 
coefficient of volume of business operation, q1 is the coefficient 
of utilization of container freight, q1, q2 are more than 0.
So the income function of the enterprise can be expressed as:
U q q x q p
2 0 1 2
2= + −( ) + −p B C
The enterprise can also refuse or choose other agent in the 
second stage of the game, so there is an opportunity benefit, 
this paper uses the average profit level of the industry replace 
the opportunity benefit, only  U2 ≥ μ ̅  the enterprise will accept 
the commission. That is:
q q x q p
0 1 2
2+ −( ) + − ≥p B C µ
4.3 The effort that the enterprises make
Enterprises understand their own income function, so the 
degree of effort can be focused when they select, choose to make 
efforts which can gain the maximum operating income. That is:
max max p B CU q q x q p
2 0 1 2
2= + −( ) + − 
In summary, the game model of government and enterprises 
in this study is:
max maxU q q x q p m a F x C I
1 0 1 2
2 2
0
= + −( ) + + + −( ) − +( ) − α β γx b
s t
x b
. .
max max
q q x q p p a F x C
U q q x q p
0 1 2
2 2
0
2 0 1 2
+ −( ) + + + −( ) − + ≥
= + −
α β γ µ
2 2
0( ) + + + −( ) − +( ) 



 p a F bx Cα β γx
4.4 Model solution
The model is solved by backward induction. The first deriv-
ative of (3) can be obtained:
d dxU pq ax bx_ _2 1 2( ) = + −
Make it equal to 0, then will get,
x pq a b^ * _ ,= +( )1 2²
That is, after the enterprise accepting the commission of 
government, choose the maximum degree of effort to maxi-
mize enterprise income, take it into (1) and (2), can get:
max max[U q q pq a
b
q p m a pq a
b
F
b pq
1 0 1
1
2
2 1
1
2 2
= +
+
− + +
+
+ −





−
+
² ²
³α β
a
b
C I²
2
2
0





 +





 − ]
q q pq a
b
q p p a pq a
b
F
b pq a
b
0 1
1
2
2 1
1
2 2
2
+
+
−




 + +
+
+ −





−
+
² ²
³
²
α β





 +





 ≥
2
0
C µ
The first derivative of (4) can be obtained:
d dU amq a b F_ _ ^1 1 2 2( ) = +( ) + − −β β γ
Make it equal to 0, can get the optimal government subsidy 
coefficient,
β γ^ * _ ^= −( ) −( )−2 1 2b F amq a
According to the optimal government subsidy coefficient, 
under the goal of the government to get the best social benefit, 
the optimal amount of subsidies relate to the shipper that the 
highest of the enterprise is willing to pay, the service level of 
enterprises, the government specified minimum service level, 
enterprise business operation cost coefficient, effort level of 
enterprise and service level conversion coefficient, container 
quantity the business operation effected by the effort of enter-
prise and external random factors.
(1)
(5)
(4)
(3)
(2)
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5 Numerical analysis
The numbers set in the paper refers to the numbers of 
“Chongqing - Xinjiang - Europe” Chongqing - Alataw Pass 
-Duisburg (specific parameter values are shown in Table 2). For 
the convenience of calculation, the influence of random factors 
on the service level of enterprises is not considered. So under 
the goal of the government to get the best social benefits, the 
relationship between the amount of government subsidies B, 
the highest price m which the shipper is willing to pay, and the 
degree of effort x is shown in Fig. 1. 
Table 2 Parameter settings
α(Thousand
dollar/FEU)
α(Thousand
dollar/FEU)
m(Thousand
dollar/FEU)
1 3 0<m<20
q1 F̅ a
0.2 0.5 0.9
Fig. 1 The relationship between the amount of government subsidies and the 
highest price and the degree of effort that the enterprise is willing to pay
It is clear to see in Fig. 1, that in order to achieve the best 
social benefits, CR Express has a subsidy of 1.9 thousand dollars 
to 4.5 thousand dollars for per FEU. The amount of subsidy is 
related to the highest price and the degree of effort that the enter-
prise is willing to pay. When the degree of effort x is less than 
0.6, the amount of government subsidies B is positively related 
to the highest rate m; the smaller x is, the stronger the correlation 
between B and m will be. When the degree of effort x is greater 
than or equal to 0.6, the amount of government subsidy B is neg-
atively correlated with the highest rate m, but with the increase 
of x, relevant of B and m is small. When the degree of effort of 
the enterprise x is 0.95, the highest price that the enterprise is 
willing to pay m is 19.5 thousand dollars per FEU, the amount 
of subsidies B reach the minimum value of 1.9 thousand dollars 
per FEU. And the region with the lowest B value appeared in the 
region with larger m value and x value, it means that the higher 
the enterprise is willing to pay, the greater degree of efforts of the 
enterprise to spare, the government is more likely to get the max-
imum social benefits with the smaller subsidies to CR Express.
6 Conclusion and prospects
As the running of CR Express is in the early stages of the 
market, it has not yet fully realized market-oriented operation, 
and many local governments take out their respective subsidy 
policies to support the development of CR Express. Based on 
the dynamic game of incomplete information, this paper stud-
ies the Optimal Subsidy of local government to get the best 
social benefits. In the reference of the data of the “Chongqing 
- Xinjiang - Europe” Chongqing - Alataw Pass -Duisburg line, 
the numerical analysis is carried out. According to the research 
results, this paper puts forward the following policy recom-
mendations for the local governments to make a reasonable 
plan for the subsidies to CR Express:
1. Different amount of subsidies for different value added 
container goods. In order to achieve a higher social ben-
efit, the government needs to give a lower subsidy to the 
goods with high added value, especially, when the enter-
prise has a higher effort level; for the high value-added 
goods, the government can obtain higher social bene-
fits in a lower amount of subsidies; but when the enter-
prise has a low effort level, in order to obtain a higher 
social benefits, the government needs to provide a higher 
amount of subsidies for low value-added goods.
2. Encourage enterprises to play the advantages of rail-
way transport, and carry more high value-added goods. 
The railway transportation is faster than the traditional 
shipping, although the price is higher. So, CR Express is 
highly competitive in the high value-added goods, and 
shippers are willing to pay higher prices for goods with 
high added value. The government can achieve higher 
social benefits by encouraging enterprises to carry high 
value-added goods, in order to improve the maximum 
price limit that the shipper is willing to pay.
3. Encourage enterprises to improve service quality to set 
the “ CR Express” brand. CR Express is the international 
logistics brand supported by the nation, the government 
should encourage enterprises to improve the quality of 
service, and jointly promote the development of CR 
Express brand. The government encourages enterprises 
to improve the quality of service in order to gain a higher 
level of effort; when the enterprises pay higher level of 
effort, the government is more likely to obtain higher 
social benefits in a lower amount of subsidies.
Based on the existence of government subsidies, the author 
studies the game relationship between the local government 
and the local enterprises of CR Express, and the author has 
not considered the withdrawal mechanism of government sub-
sidies. Moreover, the research of this paper is less related to the 
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shipper’s expenditure and income. The future research direc-
tion is to consider the game relationships among the govern-
ment, the enterprise and the shipper, and the optimal scheme 
and the exit mechanism of the government subsidies.
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